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Abstract
This paper examines estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using in-
strumental variable regression methods. It is argued that the ‘standard instru-
ment’ for the net-of-tax rate − the rate that would be applicable post-reform
but with unchanged income levels − is unsatisfactory in contexts where there
are substantial exogenous changes in taxable income. Two alternative tax rate
instruments are proposed, using estimates of the dynamics of taxable income for
a panel of taxpayers over a period that involves no tax changes. The parameters
derived from this procedure are then used to construct hypothetical (or counter-
factual) post-reform incomes that would be expected in the absence of reform.
The first method is based on the tax rate each individual would face if income
were equal to ‘expected income’, conditional on income in two periods before the
tax change. The second alternative uses the form of the conditional distribution
of income for each taxpayer to obtain an instrument based on the ‘expected tax
rate’. The methods are applied to the tax change in New Zealand in 2001.
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1 Introduction
The ‘elasticity of taxable income’ (ETI) was proposed by Feldstein (1995) as a way of
capturing the combined impact of various economic responses to changes in marginal
income tax rates.1 The elasticity is defined in terms of the response of taxable income
to variations in the net-of-tax rate, 1−  , rather than the marginal tax rate,  , and is
therefore expected to be positive. There has been a plethora of empirical estimates of
the elasticity, mainly for the US and using a variety of methods. However, as the recent
review by Saez et al. (2012) points out, estimation presents a number of challenges.
In particular, Saez et al. (2012, p. 18, emphasis added) point out that, ‘in order to
isolate the effects of the net-of-tax rate, one would want to compare observed reported
incomes after the tax rate change to the incomes that would have been reported had
the tax change not taken place. Obviously, the latter are not observed and must be
estimated’.
This paper has two main objectives. First, it examines the use of instrumental
variable regression methods. It is argued that the ‘standard instrument’ for the net-of-
tax rate − the rate that would be applicable post-reform but with unchanged income
levels − is unsatisfactory in contexts where there are substantial exogenous changes
in taxable income.2 This is in addition to acknowledged problems associated with
controlling for income changes as part of the regression specification. Two alternative
tax rate instruments are proposed that, it is suggested, better approximate the desired
tax rate. The approach advocated here to deal with the challenge posed by Saez et
al. involves estimating the dynamics of taxable income for a panel of taxpayers, using
data over a period that involves no tax changes. The parameters derived from this
procedure are then used to construct hypothetical (or counterfactual) post-reform in-
comes that would be expected in the absence of reform. From the resulting probability
distribution of income for each taxpayer, two alternative net-of-tax rate instruments
1A key property of the elasticity is that it captures all responses to a change in the tax rate in
a simple reduced-form specification and, under certain conditions, provides a convenient method of
calculating the welfare effects of tax changes. See, for example, Seaz et al. (2012) for further discussion
and Creedy (2010) for a technical introduction.
2Studies using the standard approach include, for example, Moffitt and Wilhelm (1998), Auten
and Carroll (1999), Goolsbee (2000), Sillamaa and Veall (2000), Aarbu and Thoresen (2001), Gruber
and Saez (2002), Selen (2002), Giertz (2004, 2007, 2010), Hansson (2004), Kopczuk (2005), Thomas
(2007), Auten et al. (2008), Heim (2009). Carroll (2008) is based on the tax rate evaluated at the
average taxable income over a seven year period.
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may be obtained. One instrument is based on the tax rate each individual would face
if their income were equal to ‘expected income’, conditional on income in the previous
two periods and knowledge of the process of relative income dynamics. The preferred
alternative uses the form of the conditional distribution of income for each taxpayer
to obtain an instrument based on their ‘expected tax rate’. The second objective is to
use the proposed new instruments to estimate the elasticity of taxable income in New
Zealand, using information about taxable incomes for a sample of taxpayers before and
after the income tax rate changes in 2001. This reform provides an especially useful
context in which to examine the performance of the three instruments, given the na-
ture of that reform and the availability of suitable data to estimate ‘no reform’ income
dynamics.
Following a brief review of existing estimates obtained using instrumental variable
and other methods in section 2, section 3 summarises the basic instrumental variable
specification. Section 4 compares some key properties of the ‘standard instrument’ and
the two proposed alternatives. The construction of these alternatives is described in
detail in Section 5. Section 6 applies the various instruments to a tax policy change in
New Zealand in 2001 and discusses the resulting estimates of the elasticity of taxable
income. Brief conclusions are provided in section 7.
2 Approaches to Estimation
In examining the elasticity of taxable income using regression methods, a constant
elasticity specification is ubiquitous in the literature, whereby the logarithm of taxable
income is expressed as a linear function of the logarithm of the net-of-tax rate. Fixed
effects are generally eliminated by taking first-differences, so the form of equation to be
estimated has the change in the logarithm of taxable income related to the change in
the logarithm of the net-of-tax rate (these log-changes also providing approximations
to the proportional changes), along with other available exogenous variables such as
age. The approach therefore requires information about taxable income of a sample
of individuals in at least two years (before and after a tax structure change), and the
regression is cross-sectional.3 In addition, some measure of initial or lagged income is
3Time-series regressions have also been examined, especially for tests involving changes over time
in the income shares of various segments of the taxpayer income distribution in association with tax
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often added as a regressor, to capture any tendency for proportional income changes to
depend on income levels (that is, the existence of any regression towards or away from
the mean). All the observed change in income is attributed to the tax change and the
exogenous variables included in the regression.
The reduced-form specification faces the well known problem that, with a nonlinear
income tax function reflecting marginal rate progression, the change in the net-of-tax
rate is itself endogenous. To overcome this problem a number of authors have used an
instrumental variable (equivalent to two-stage least squares) approach, in which the
instrument is, for each individual, the marginal tax rate which would be faced in the
second period if there were no change in income.4 The first stage involves a regression of
the change in the actual log-net-of-tax rate on the change in the log-net-of-tax rate that
would apply with no change in income, and other exogenous variables. This is used to
obtain ‘predicted’ values of the log-change in the net of tax rate. The latter is then used
in the second stage regression (with the change in the logarithm of income as dependent
variable) instead of the actual change. Hence, the most commonly adopted ‘standard
instrument’ involves using the tax rate that would apply post-reform to the taxpayer’s
pre-reform income. Where comparisons involve a number of years, annual incomes
are often adjusted for inflation.5 Alternatively, in determining the individual’s reform-
only change in marginal tax rates, some studies have adopted a common intermediate
income between pre- and post-reform levels.6
As is well-known, following Feldstein’s (1995) relatively large estimates for the ETI
(he found values between 1 and 3 for the 1986 and 1993 US tax reforms), subsequent
studies have tended to find lower values. ‘Typical’ values are increasingly reported
in the 02—06 range. These are often claimed to be more plausible, at least for the
contexts in which they are estimated — mainly US taxpayers, often with high incomes.
However, recent reviews of this literature by Giertz (2009) and Saez et al. (2012)
rate changes; see, for example, Saez (2004) and Saez et al. (2012).
4See Giertz (2009) and Saez et al. (2012) and references cited there.
5However, this is not an innocuous adjustment for estimates of ETI responses. Since tax liability is
defined in nominal terms, a nominal income increase involving no real income change could nevertheless
be associated with a tax-induced income response where nominal fiscal drag pushes the taxpayer into
a higher tax bracket. Indeed this is the identification method adopted by Saez (2003) to obtain ETI
estimates from ‘bracket creep’.
6For example, Auten and Carroll (1999) use an average of pre- and post-reform incomes, while
Blomquist and Selin (2009) use an intermediate year.
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have suggested that even the more rigorous recent studies, including those employing a
variety of income controls, obtain a wide range of statistically significant ETI estimates
including negative values.
Table 1: Regression Estimates for US Tax Reforms
Tax Reform MTR Range of estimates
change A: Regressions B: Other
Low High Low High
Goolsbee (1999)
1924-25 ↓ 054 062 067 124
1932 ↑ 021 027 024 031
1935 ↑ −083 −050 −046 −011
1935 (high income) ↑ −059 028
1950-51 ↑ 010 017 003 044
1964 ↓ 000 004 −022 008
1971-72 (high income) ↓ −019 022
1985-86 ↓ 088 115 022 207
Saez et al. (2012)
1981 (top 1% & 9%) ↓ − 9%: 021 1%: 060
1986 (top 1% & 9%) ↓ − 9%: −020 1%: 136
1993 (top 1%) ↑ −039 045
1993 (next 9%) ↑ −037 046 without income controls
1993 (next 9%) ↑ −167 242 with income controls
1993 (next 49%) ↑ −187 335 with and without inc. controls
1960-2006 (top 1%) 058 171 with time controls
1960-2006 (next 9%) −005 001 with time controls
Kopczuk (2005)
1980s ↓ −109 138 with and without inc. controls
Auten et al. (2008)
2001 and 2003 ↓ 026 067 with income controls
Geirtz (2009)
1990 and 1993 (weighted) ↑ −034 054 with income controls
1990 and 1993 (unweighted) ↑ −290 023 with income controls
Table 1 summarises results from five such studies: Goolsbee (1999), Kopczuk
(2005), Auten et al. (2008), Giertz (2009) and Saez et al. (2012), covering all major US
tax reform episodes since 1924—25. Results are reported separately for regression-based
(usually instrumental variable) and other methods. These reform episodes include both
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tax increases and tax cuts, though the vast majority of ETI studies of tax reforms over
the last 50—60 years involve marginal tax rate reductions. Table 1 shows that, with or
without income controls, negative ETI estimates are not uncommon, and some large
positive values continue to be reported.
These results serve to emphasise that, even where small positive and plausible ETI
estimates are reported, they generally form part of a suite of results that include a
much wider range of values, including ‘wrongly’ signed estimates. Partly in response
to the varied findings, Giertz (2010) concludes that ‘it is incredibly difficult to isolate
responses to changes in tax rates from income changes due to a myriad of other complex
factors. While flexible income controls are intended to control for both mean reversion
and divergence within the income distribution, it is impossible to conclude that these
problems are adequately mitigated’.
It is shown here that using the standard instrument is likely to involve a number
of biases, the sign and size of which depend on the nature of the tax reform and
the exogenous income changes that occur in association with it. Indeed, the new
instruments proposed below were stimulated by finding a completely unrealistic value
of the elasticity using the standard approach in the New Zealand context.
3 The Specification
Consider an income tax change between periods 1 and 2, involving changes in mar-
ginal rates, , for periods  = 1 2, and tax brackets  = 1 . The number of
thresholds, in addition to various rates, may change from period 1 to 2. Information is
available about the taxable income,  of  = 1   individuals in each period. Let
  denote the marginal tax rate actually faced by individual  in period . This is the
appropriate rate, depending on , from the set of rates . Define:
 = log (1−  2)− log (1−  1) (1)
which is an approximation for the proportional change in the net-of-tax rate, 1 −  .
The proportional change in taxable income, , is approximated by:
 = log 2 − log 1 (2)
A simple constant elasticity relationship between taxable income and the net-of-tax
marginal rate, ignoring for the moment exogenous variables which may influence income
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changes, is:
 = +  +  (3)
where  is a random variable and  is the elasticity of taxable income.
There are inevitably income changes which would occur in the absence of tax
changes. In general it is difficult to isolate groups of individuals who would other-
wise experience the same pattern of income changes but where only one group faces a
tax change. The challenge is thus to avoid attributing those exogenous income changes
to the tax rate changes.7
Estimation of the form in (3), augmented by further exogenous variables, presents
a fundamental problem because of the endogeneity of the change in the log-tax-rate.
This means that ordinary least squares estimates are biased and inconsistent. In order
to avoid this problem, researchers have used the following instrumental variable (or
equivalently, a two-stage least squares) approach in which the instrument, , is used,
defined as:
 = log ¡1−  ∗2¢− log (1−  1) (4)
where  ∗2 is the marginal tax rate that would be faced by the individual in period 2 if
taxable income were to remain constant at 1.
The first stage involves a linear regression of  on  and all the exogenous variables
in the model, and the calculation of the ‘predicted’ values, ˆ, using the parameter
estimates (also indicated by ‘hats’) so that, again ignoring the other exogenous variables
discussed above for convenience:
ˆ = ˆ + ˆ (5)
The second stage then involves estimating the elasticity of taxable income,  using
ordinary least squares on:
 = + ˆ +  (6)
The question examined here is whether this is a reliable approach, bearing in mind
that for  to be a good instrument, it must be correlated with  but independent of
the errors, and uncorrelated with  other than via any effects on .8
7The difference-in-difference approach, whether regression-based or not, essentially relies on being
able to isolate ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups that can reasonably be regarded as otherwise identical
(at least with respect to aspects relevant to the tax response under investigation).
8The regression of  on  implies (in the absence of other exogenous variables) that for  = 0,
ˆ = ˆ. These different cases thus have values of  aligned along a straight line at ˆ = ˆ.
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4 Alternative Instruments
This section considers problems associated with the standard instrument and proposes
two alternatives. It shows that with non-tax related income changes — a ubiquitous
feature of the income dynamics of most taxpayers — it is not surprising that a tax
rate instrument that ignores those changes may perform poorly. Typically, exogenous
variables are added to the basic specification in (6) to capture elements of income
dynamics. However, the alternative approaches suggested here also involve the use of
an independently estimated process of earnings dynamics in the construction of the
instrument itself.
4.1 The Standard Instrument
Figure 1 shows a segment of a multi-step tax function. Consider an individual in the th
tax bracket with initial (period 1) taxable income of 1, facing the (pre-reform) marginal
tax rate, . A reform which decreases  in period 2 with thresholds unchanged,
would be expected to increase taxable income. However, other exogenous influences
on income, ceteris paribus, could either raise or lower period 2 income, yielding observed
income in period 2, 2 or 02 respectively. Thus, where exogenous income increases and
the expected tax effect operate in the same direction, observed income increases to
2. For an exogenous income fall, the expected tax response operates in the opposite
direction to the income change, compensating for the exogenous income fall, as shown
by the arrows around 02.
Therefore tax cuts are expected to be negatively correlated with observed income
changes (the a priori relationship) for exogenous sources of income increase, but pos-
itively correlated for exogenous income decreases.9 For a tax reform involving an
increase, rather than a decrease, in , these correlations are reversed. For any given
reform, the problem for the empirical investigator therefore is to separate the two un-
observable components of each taxpayer’s observed income changes from periods 1 to
2.
Table 2 shows the resulting bias that can be expected in standard instrument esti-
mates of the income response to a tax structure change in the presence of exogenous
9Additionally, some observed income increases could arise where an exogenous decrease is more
than compensated by the increase in income in response to a marginal tax cut, and vice versa.
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Figure 1: Income and Tax Rate Changes
Table 2: Tax Rate Instrument Biases
 reform ∆ (exogenous)
Decrease Increase
Decrease + −
Increase − +
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income changes for which allowance is not fully made; as before  refers to the mar-
ginal rate facing the individual, depending on the income level and thus the tax bracket
into which the individual falls.10
For example, consider the final row of Table 2, which shows that an increase in
 due to a reform is expected a priori to reduce income. The standard instrument
avoids attributing to the tax reform any observed tax rate reduction induced by the
income fall. However any exogenous increases in income would raise the taxpayer’s
marginal rate where that income change involves crossing a tax threshold. Failure
to accommodate this second effect within the instrumented tax rate therefore risks
attributing some of this positive association between exogenous income change and
tax rates to the tax instrument. That is, the parameter on the tax rate term in an
instrumental variable regression, attempting to capture the behavioural response to
tax reform, is likely to be positively biased (less negative, or more positive).
As mentioned above, a number of existing studies of taxable income elasticities do
attempt to control for other sources of income change, such as regression towards the
mean, though this income change process is generally not allowed to affect the measure-
ment of the tax instrument.11 Since imperfect controls for exogenous income changes
could result in either over- or under-estimates of their effects, the resulting biases could
be in the opposite direction to the ‘no income control’ cases above. However, the ten-
dency for US elasticity estimates to be based on reforms involving tax cuts (increases
in 1−), in association with average nominal or real incomes increases (independently
of tax reform) suggests the possibility of negative biases in Table 2 predominating in
these cases.
This simple illustration therefore demonstrates the importance, for accurate es-
timation of tax responses, of first modelling non-tax induced changes in incomes as
accurately as possible and without systematic bias. Second, where exogenous income
changes are imperfectly captured, it is important to be aware of the different biases
associated with estimates of tax-induced income responses. As Table 2 shows, these
10The signs of the biases are reversed when changes in the net-of-tax rate, 1 −  , are used to
capture responses.
11For example, Auten et al. (2008) use the tax rate associated with the paxpayer’s taxable income
in year −3 to capture ‘reform-only’ tax changes (tax reform in year ). As with other ‘initial income’
tax rate instruments, this will not necessarily measure the tax rate that the taxpayer would have faced
in the absense of reform.
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depend on the type of tax reform and the exogenous income changes experienced. To
the extent that income changes, in the absence of tax reforms, follow a systematic
pattern, rather than being purely random, the biases can be substantial. The following
subsection suggests how information about income dynamics can be directly used in
the construction of a tax rate instrument.
4.2 Incorporating Income Dynamics
A partial solution to deal with potential biases was suggested by Saez et al. (2012, p.
27-8), whereby, ‘in situations with mean reversion, it is useful to include episodes of
both increases and decreases in tax rates for identification, as mean reversion creates
biases in opposite directions in the case of tax increases versus tax decreases’. Saez et
al. (2012, p. 28) also find that ‘panel regression estimates of taxable income responses
are sensitive to the choice of instrument for the marginal tax rate’, such that ‘standard
methods do not control adequately for mean reversion’. Indeed, as argued further be-
low, these standard methods cannot capture more general features of income dynamics,
such that their ability to separate ‘tax reform only’ from ‘non-tax induced’ changes in
income is questionable, especially given the potential for various, reform-specific, biases
described above.
The key problem with the standard instrument is that it represents the simplest
approximation of income dynamics, namely no change in (real) reported incomes in
the absence of tax reform. The alternative approach proposed here provides more
sophisticated modelling of taxpayers’ income dynamics, using annual income data that,
by construction, are unaffected by tax reform.
The method captures any exogenous regression to the mean and serial correlation in
relative income changes over a number of years during which there are no tax changes,
to yield predicted values of future incomes, given current and past income levels. This
yields a conditional probability distribution of income for each future year and tax-
payer. Using this information allows construction of two possible marginal tax rate
instruments. First, the mean income from the conditional income distribution, given
initial income for each taxpayer, for any post-reform year, , (), can be obtained.
For this expected mean income, the associated tax rate is obtained from the post-
reform tax code. This instrument is labelled  ∗(). Here individual subscripts have
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been suppressed.
Alternatively, the complete probability distribution of incomes for year  for each
taxpayer can be used in conjunction with the post-reform tax code to obtain the set
of tax rates associated with each income level. Using the full income distribution to
weight each tax rate appropriately yields an ‘expected marginal tax rate’ after reform
which more fully incorporates information on income dynamics. This expected tax rate
instrument is labelled  ∗().
In terms of Figure 1, a probability distribution of income, centred for example on 2,
potentially includes a wide dispersion of incomes with associated tax rates  and −1,
as well as +1 and any other higher or lower rates. Hence, whereas the set of ‘expected
income’ based tax rates,  ∗(), includes only the discrete set of rates specified in the
tax schedule, ‘expected tax rates’,  ∗(), can take a wide range of values, reflecting the
income-weighting of each discrete rate.
4.3 Correlations among Measures
To explore the merits of these alternative instruments, and given the earlier discussion
of potential biases, it is first useful to consider their correlations with observed income
changes. Of interest here is the observed changes in income, ∆, and tax rates, ∆ ,
and the change in the relevant tax rate instrument, ∆ ∗. To simplify the exposition at
this stage, changes in tax rates,  , rather than net-of-tax rates, 1−  , are considered.
Table 3 shows, for any individual, the possible combinations of ∆, changes in
the actual tax rate ∆ = ( 2 −  1), and the instrumented tax rate ∆ ∗ = ( ∗2 −  1)
between the pre- and post-reform periods (1 and 2 respectively). There are 3×3×3 =
27 possible combinations of negative, zero or positive change. The zero income change
cases are excluded from Table 3, leaving 18 possible cases.12 Of the 18 cases, 2 are not
feasible with a tax schedule with marginal rate progression everywhere; for example, a
positive income change cannot be associated with an actual marginal tax rate decrease.
Given the 16 possible combinations of values for ∆ ∆  and ∆ ∗ in Table 3, Table
4 shows the unconditional partial correlations, , between the income change and each
of the three tax instruments, where ∆ ∗1 is the (change in the) standard instrument
12This keeps the number of cases more manageable and, in the empirical analysis below, less than
0.04 per cent of over 800,000 taxpayers had unchanged pre- and post-reform incomes (to the nearest
$1).
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discussed above, but applied to ∆ rather than ∆ (1− ). Tax changes for the new
proposed instruments are shown as ∆ ∗() and ∆ ∗().
The table identifies, with a tick (X), those categories where the correlation between
the income change and each tax instrument takes the expected, ceteris paribus, negative
sign:   0. Other entries (‘incorrect’ zero or positive correlation:  > 0) are shown
by a cross (×). There are also several ‘not feasible’ cases. These arise either because
of the increasing marginal rate nature of the tax schedule as discussed above (cases 4
and 8) or because they are not feasible for the particular tax instrument in question.
Table 3: Outcomes for Income and Marginal Rate Changes
No. ∆ ∆ ∆ ∗ Comment
1  0  0  0
2  0  0 0
3  0  0  0
4  0 0  0 NA
5  0 0 0
6  0 0  0
7  0  0  0
8  0  0 0 NA
9  0  0  0
10  0  0  0
11  0  0 0
12  0  0  0
13  0 0  0
14  0 0 0
15  0 0  0
16  0  0  0
17  0  0 0
18  0  0  0
Table 4 also reveals that there are four cases (7, 11, 12, 15) for the standard in-
strument, which are not feasible, but which can be accommodated by the other two
instruments. This reflects the relative inflexibility of the standard instrument’s prop-
erty that the instrumented tax rate is always that which applies to initial income.
Section 6 below compares the regression-based performance of these three instru-
ments in the context of the year 2001 tax reforms in New Zealand. But it is useful
here to consider the numbers of New Zealand taxpayers who fall into each of the above
13
Table 4: Correlations between Income changes and Tax Instruments
Cat. (∆ ∆ ∗1) (∆ ∆ ∗()) (∆ ∆ ∗())
X =   0; × =  > 0; NA = not feasible
1 × × ×
2 × × ×
3 X X X
4 NA NA NA
5 × × ×
6 X X X
7 NA X X
8 NA NA NA
9 X X X
10 X X X
11 NA × ×
12 NA × ×
13 X X X
14 × × ×
15 NA X X
16 X X X
17 × × ×
18 × × ×
Table 5: New Zealand Income Tax Structure: 1999 and 2002
1999 Tax Structure 2002 Tax Structure
Income range Tax rate Income range Tax rate
1− 9 500 015 1− 9 500 015
9 501− 34 200 02175 9 501− 34 200 021
34 201− 38 000 024 34 201− 38 000 021
 38 001 033 38 001− 60 000 033
 60 001 039
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categories. Table 5 shows the pre- and post-reform New Zealand tax rates. Of the four
marginal rates in the tax schedule in 1999, the reform involved 0.75 and 3 percentage
point decreases in two middle tax rates respectively (from 21.75 and 24 per cent to a
common 21 per cent rate) and a 6 percentage point increase in the top rate (from 33
to 39 per cent) for incomes above $60,000.13
These represent approximate percentage changes in the three reformed tax rates
(using log differences) of −35, −134 and +167 per cent.14 This makes the New
Zealand reform a particularly helpful one to analyse in this context because of the
mixture of tax rate increases and decreases (and no change) across a wide range of
incomes.
Based on pre- and post-reform years of 1999 and 2002, the framework in Table 4 can
be used to compare each taxpayer’s observed change in income with changes in their
actual and instrumented tax rates; these years are chosen to avoid effects of income
shifting between the announcement and implementation of the tax change; see Claus
et al. (2012) for further discussion of this phenomenon.
Table 6 shows the numbers of taxpayers in each category, separated into those
categories where  > 0 (columns 1—4) and   0 (columns 5—8), where  refers to the
unconditional correlation between the income change and the change in the relevant tax
instrument. The correlation of interest to identify behavioural responses to tax rate
reform is the conditional correlation between the tax instrument and reform-related
income change. However, since all three tax instruments considered here attempt, in
their different ways, to control for income changes in defining each instrument, the sign
on the unconditional correlation involving the total income change might be expected
to provide a useful guide to the prospects of finding a similarly signed conditional
correlation.
The final row of Table 6 shows that the total numbers of correlations involving
the expected tax rate, ∗(), yield quite different outcomes from those involving the
other two instruments:  ∗(1) and  ∗(). In particular, there is a much higher ratio
of incorrectly signed correlations ( > 0) to correctly signed correlations (  0) for
the standard and expected income instruments. Around 54 per cent (431/803) of
13The lowest rate, applicable up to $16,000, remained at 15 per cent, with the 33 per cent rate
applicable to incomes in the range $38-60,000.
14Equivalent percentage changes in the net-of-tax rate, 1−  , are −10, −29 and +94 per cent.
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Table 6: Number of Taxpayers by Correlation Category: 1000s
 > 0   0
Cat  ∗ [1]  ∗ [ ()]  ∗ [ ( ∗)] Cat  ∗ [1]  ∗ [ ()]  ∗ [ ( ∗)]
1 53 27 122 3 122 123 99
2 46 71 0 6 0 19 101
5 101 82 0 7 0 small 194
11 0 6 0 9 194 194 0
12 0 small 25 10 25 19 small
14 35 44 0 13 18 7 small
17 44 40 0 15 0 2 53
18 152 163 57 16 13 6 152
Total 431 433 204 372 370 599
correlations for those two instruments reveal  > 0, whereas for  ∗() the ratio is only
25 per cent (204/803).
However, the expected tax rate does not out-perform in all categories, in the sense
of having more negative correlations than the other instruments. Table 6 reveals that,
across instruments, the numbers of positive or negative correlations can be quite differ-
ent within each category. For example, there is a very high number (122,000) of positive
correlations in category 1 using the expected tax rate, whereas the alternative instru-
ments have lower numbers: 53,000 and 27,000. An opposite ranking of instruments is
observed for (positive) correlation category 18.
The main reason for the strong correlation performance of the expected tax rate
instrument arises from its ability to reclassify 101,000 and 152,000 taxpayers in the
positive correlation categories 5 and 18 respectively into negative correlation categories
6 and 16. These numbers provide a clue as to why regression results reported below
appear strongly to favour the expected tax rate instrument over the alternatives. To
recap, the expected tax rate instrument was constructed to identify changes between
the tax rate applicable to actual 1999 income and the rate applicable to 2002 income
if the latter had been unaffected by the tax reform. This tax rate instrument appears
to be much more highly negatively correlated with observed income changes over those
years than the alternatives.
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5 Construction of Alternative Instruments
This section explains the model of income dynamics used to construct the alternative
instruments discussed in the previous section. First, income dynamics are described
in subsection 5.1. Subsection 5.2 describes the instrument based on each individual’s
conditional expected income. Subsection 5.3 presents the expected tax rate instrument.
The tax rate distributions using alternative instruments are examined in subsection 5.4
5.1 Income Dynamics
The model used here is essentially a stochastic model which identifies two types of
relative income change, arising from non-tax related factors. These are ‘regression
towards the mean’ and serial correlation in relative income changes. From Creedy
(1985), the two process are captured by the following autoregressive form, where 
is the arithmetic mean of log-income in period  and  is a random error term with
variance, 2:
log  −  = 2
¡
log −1 − −1
¢
+ 3 ¡log −2 − −2¢+  (7)
This can be rearranged as:
log − log −1 = ¡ − 2−1 − 3−2¢+(2 − 1) log −1+3 log −2+ (8)
In addition, if the age-profile of  is thought to be quadratic, then letting  denote
’s age at time, , (8) can be replaced by:
log  − log −1 = 4 + 5 + 62 + (2 − 1) log −1 + 3 log −2 +  (9)
Thus (3) can be augmented by adding the terms on the right hand side of (9). Alter-
natively, (2 − 1) log −1 + 3 log −2 can be rewritten as (2 + 3 − 1) log −1 −
3 (log −1 − log −2), so this is consistent with having terms equal to the base pe-
riod log-income and the previous period’s log-income change. In the empirical analysis
below, as in Giertz (2009), these variables are used as additional exogenous variables.
However, as explained above, the independently estimated parameters 2 and 3 can
also be used, along with 2, in the construction of an instrument. The following sub-
sections show how the alternative instruments can be constructed using estimates of
these income dynamics parameters.
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Following the tax policy change in 2001, the tax structure remained unchanged for
a number of years. Estimation of the earnings dynamics model of equation (7) involves
regressing log 05 − 05 on log 04 − 04 and log 03 − 03, for the same individuals
as used in the estimation of the elasticity of taxable income. It is nevertheless not
possible completely to rule out marginal tax rate changes related to income growth
for some individuals, since fiscal drag takes those who are near the upper income
threshold of their tax bracket into a higher-rate bracket. But if inflation is low, the
vast majority of income changes can reasonably be thought to reflect non-tax related
income movements. The data are described in Section 6. The parameter estimates of
2 and 3 are 0.6677 and 0.1988, with -values of 145.49 and 43.41, with  = 262144.15
The above specification is consistent with a dynamic process with regression towards
the mean of , where log  −  = 
¡
log −1 − −1
¢
+ , and first-order serial
correlation of , where  = −1 + . Hence, 2 =  +  and 3 = −;
see Creedy (1985). It can be shown that  =
n
2 + (22 + 43)05
o
2 = 0891 and
 =
n
2 − (22 + 43)05
o
2 = −0223. These values imply a high degree of regression
towards the mean along with negative serial correlation whereby, for example, those
who experience a large income increase are more likely to have a subsequent decrease.
These results are consistent with those obtained using New Zealand incomes from the
early 1990s; see Creedy (1998, pp. 188-191).
5.2 Tax Rate Applied to Expected Income
The instrument based on expected income uses the estimates from the income dynamics
model to construct for each person an expected income in period 2 (the post-change
year being considered), by projecting forward for the required number of years. An
instrument for the tax rate change can then be constructed using the tax rate applicable
to the ‘expected’ income which would arise from the dynamic process alone (rather
than, in the standard instrument, the rate that would apply to an unchanged income).
Formally, the procedure can be described as follows.
Use the parameter estimates from (7) to obtain values of ˆ2 by projecting forward
from period 1. This requires the values of  for the relevant years (period 1 and period
15The mean of logarithms of income in 2003, 2004 and 2005 are 10.311, 10.367 and 10.367, with
standard deviation of logarithms of 0.9194, 0.9110 and 0.9651 respectively.
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2, as well as the two years before period 1). (For the tax change considered below, it
is necessary to project several years ahead, as discussed in the following subsection.)
The values of  (2) give the expected income values in the second period under
consideration if the above process of income change were to apply in the absence of
any tax changes. Then obtain the tax rate,  ∗ [ (2)] that would be faced by the
individual, given  (2). Redefine  as  = log (1−  ∗ [ (2)])− log (1−  1) and,
as before, define  as  = log (1−  1) − log (1−  0), and let  denote age. Carry
out a regression of the form:
 = 1 + 2 + 3 + 32 + +  (10)
The exogenous variables other than age can be added to the right hand side of (10).
Finally, using the parameter estimates from (10) to obtain the ˆ values, carry out a
regression of the form:
(log 2 − log 1) = 1 + ˆ + 2 + 32 + +  (11)
One problem arising from this method is that in projecting forward, it is necessary
to use the value of 2, that is, the mean log-income in the post-change year. Thus the
estimated parameters are used with the autoregressive form to obtain, say, Φ, defined
as the appropriate right hand side of (7) obtained by setting the stochastic term equal
to zero and projecting forward from the base year. In the intermediate stages only the
terms
¡
log  − 
¢
are needed, rather than separate values of  and log . But in
the final step, ˆ2 = exp (2 + Φ), and the desired value of  is that which would occur
in the absence of tax changes, but of course cannot be known. Hence, using the actual
 for year 2 is tantamount to assuming that it was not substantially affected by the tax
change; that is, in aggregate the tax effects — from some individuals experiencing higher
rates while others experience lower rates — are small relative to the other influences on
aggregate income growth. This approximation is unavoidable.
5.3 An Instrument Based on Expected Tax Rate
This subsection examines the construction of the alternative instrument which makes
use of the conditional distribution of income that is predicted in the absence of tax
changes, rather than only the expected value. Given a distribution of income for each
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individual, conditional on income in the two years preceding the tax change, it is
possible to calculate an expected tax rate. Clearly there is no reason to expect this
rate to be the same as that applied to the conditional expected value of income in the
post-change period. Similarly, the average will not generally correspond to a statutory
marginal rate in the multi-rate structure.
As before, let  denote individual ’s income at time , and let  denote arithmetic
mean log income at time, . The process of relative income change is the same as
described in (7) above, which allows for serial correlation and regression towards the
mean in the process of relative income change. Rearranging this equation gives:
log  = ¡ − 2−1 − 3−2¢+ 2 log −1 + 3 log −2 +  (12)
Hence, assuming that  () = 0 and  () = 2 are the constant mean and variance
of  for all , taking expectations gives:
 (log | −1 −2) = ¡ − 2−1 − 3−2¢+ 2 log −1 + 3 log −2 (13)
and the variance of logarithms of conditional income is:
 (log | −1 −2) = 2 (14)
As explained earlier, in the context of the tax change in New Zealand, it is necessary to
obtain values relating to 2002, given incomes in 1999 and 1998. Hence, moving forward
one year gives:
 (log +1| −1 −2) = ¡+1 − 2 − 3−1¢
+2 (log | −1 −2) + 3 log −1 (15)
with a variance of logarithms of:
 (log +1| −1 −2) = ¡1 + 22¢2 (16)
Finally, moving a further year forward gives:
 (log +2| −1 −2) = ¡+2 − 2+1 − 3¢
+2 (log +1| −1 −2)
+3 (log | −1 −2) (17)
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with a conditional variance of logarithms of:
 (log +2| −1 −2) = ©1 + 22 ¡1 + 22¢+ 23ª2 (18)
These last two expressions can be used to give the mean and variance of log-income in
2002 conditional on income in 1999 and 1998. The variance is of course the same for
each individual.
It is possible to find the expected tax rate for the individual in period +2, given a
set of tax thresholds and rates, as follows. Suppose the income tax function has rates
 for  = 1  applying between income thresholds  and +1 where 1 = 1 and
+1 =∞. First let (log +2| −1 −2) = +2 and  (log +2| −1 −2) =
2+2, with:
+2 = log  − +2+2 (19)
On the assumption that the  are normally distributed, log-income is normally
distributed and the probability that the individual falls into the th bracket is:
+2 =  ¡+2+1¯¯ 0 1¢− ¡+2¯¯ 0 1¢ (20)
where  (| 0 1) is the area to the left of  of a standard normal distribution. Here
 ¡+2+1¯¯ 0 1¢ = 1 and  ¡+21¯¯ 0 1¢ = 0.
The expected tax rate for the individual,  ( +2) is thus:
 ( +2) =
X
=1
+2 (21)
This gives the expected tax rate instrument,  ∗ [ ( 2)] =  ( +2), for each individ-
ual.
5.4 The Distribution of the Tax Rate Instruments
In section 6, these three tax rate instruments are used to calculate the instrumented
change in the net-of-tax rate. First it is useful to compare the distributions of  ∗ for
the three cases. That is, each of the three methods yields a predicted tax rate in
2002 for each taxpayer. For the standard and expected income instruments these are
represented by the four statutory tax rates in the 2002 schedule. For the expected tax
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rate instrument, being an income-weighted average, in principle these may take any
number of possible values between the lowest and highest statutory rates, of 15 and 39
per cent respectively.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Tax Rate Instruments
The top half of Figure 2 shows the percentage of taxable income associated with
taxpayers facing the respective marginal rates based on the first two instrumental vari-
able measures. This ‘taxable income share’ distribution is more relevant for behavioural
responses than the equivalent share of taxpayers. As can be seen in Figure 2, the share
of income facing the four different rates is quite similar. However, whereas the standard
instrument produces an increasing share of income across the 21, 33 and 39 per cent
rates, the reverse is true for the expected income tax instrument. Taxpayers facing
the 39 per cent marginal rate (based on these instruments) account for almost 40 per
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cent of taxable income using the standard instrument, but the corresponding propor-
tion is less than 20 per cent based on the expectd income instrument. This probably
reflects the ability of the expected income instrument to capture the likelihood that
some of those observed (pre-reform) in the top tax bracket, experience an income fall
that pushes them into a lower tax bracket. (Those experiencing an expected income
increase, on the other hand, cannot shift into a higher tax bracket). The standard
instrument cannot accommodate this aspect.
The lower half of Figure 2 shows the equivalent histogram for the expected tax rate
instrument. Both the share of taxpayers, and the share of taxable income, are included
for comparison. In each case the expected tax rate shown on the horizontal axis, for
example, 24 and 25 per cent, represents the share of income, or taxpayers, having a
tax rate instrument lying between 24.00 and 24.99 per cent, 25.00 and 25.99 per cent
and so on.
The resulting range of expected tax rates is, in fact, much narrower than for the
other two instruments, lying between rates of 24 and 33. This reflects the weighting
process across the probability distribution of possible tax rates with a minimum and
maximum rate respectively of 15 and 39 per cent. The distribution of taxable income
shares associated with these tax rates can be seen to be slightly asymmetric around
a mode of 28 per cent, with a more-skewed distribution using the share of taxpayers
which has a mode of 27 per cent.16
6 Applications: The 2001 Tax Change
Table 5 in section 4 shows the New Zealand income tax structure reforms in 2001.
After a period with relatively few changes, the 2001 reforms represented a significant
policy change, involving a number of tax rate changes, but especially an increase in
the top marginal rate from 0.33 to 0.39 above $60,000. This policy change is examined
using comparisons of top income shares by Claus et al. (2012). They show that the
announcement of the tax changes led to a certain amount of income shifting between
periods, so that a comparison between incomes in 2000 and those immediately after
16Symmetry of these expected tax rate distributions would not be expected, even with a symmetric
income distribution, given the non-uniform differences between the statutory tax rates on which they
are based (15, 21, 33 and 39 per cent).
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the change gives highly misleading results. Using a longer interval allows for these
inter-temporal shifts in income to settle down.
The income dynamics model discussed above allows for the possible effect of re-
gression towards the mean in generating relative income changes that are independent
of tax changes, along with serially correlated changes; that is, proportional changes
may depend on previous proportional changes as well as relative income position. In
examining the 2001 New Zealand tax change, period 2 refers to 2002. Period 1 refers
to 1999, so that the use of lagged income terms requires information on incomes in
1998.
In addition to the age terms and income terms in the regression, a dummy variable
was added to allow for the composition of income. This dummy was set equal to zero
if the individual received only wage or salary income in 1998, 1999 and 2002, the three
years used in the regressions. The dummy was set equal to 1 if the individual received,
either in addition to or instead of wage and salary income, any ‘other income’. Other
income includes the following official income categories: dividends, trust and estate
income, partnership, rental income, business or other income, shareholder employee
income, and overseas income. Subsection 6.1 describes the special dataset used here.
Subsection 6.2 presents the regression results, while subsection 6.3 considers in further
detail the characteristics of those who responded to the tax changes.
6.1 The Data
The database used here was constructed by randomly sampling the Inland Revenue
Department’s individual taxpayer population, and covers the period 1994—2009. The
number of taxpayers in the random sample rises from 138,464 in 1999 to 139,420 in
2002. The sample is weighted to match the individual taxpayer population, which
increased from 2,800,528 taxpayers in 1999 to 2,962,200 in 2002.
For the regressions outlined below, various restrictions are imposed on the data.
Age restrictions are imposed in order to remove those taxpayers likely to be in the
very early stages of their careers as well as those becoming eligible for New Zealand
superannuation. Only taxpayers aged 25-64 across the entire period are included.
Income restrictions are also imposed, in order to remove very high income earners (over
$1 million in 1999) and those likely to be receiving some form of government benefit
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(under $16,000). The latter face abatements rates which mean that their effective
marginal tax rates differ significantly from those of a standard taxpayer. Finally,
those without sufficient income data across all relevant years (1998, 1999, 2002, 2003,
2004 and 2005) are necessarily excluded. As a result, the sample size is reduced to
38,744, which, when weighted up to reflect the population, represents 803,920 individual
taxpayers. Further details of the data, the restrictions and the sampling process are
given in Appendix B.
6.2 Regression Results
The results of applying the three alternative instruments to a sample of over 800,000
taxpayers are reported in Table 7. The standard instrument gives an estimated elastic-
ity of a huge negative number, −175 (-value = −011) which is obviously meaningless.
Also, none of the coefficients on the age and income variables is significantly different
from zero.
Introducing the first of the alternative instruments, the tax rate associated with
expected income in 2002, in Table 7, radically changes the parameter estimates. In
particular, using the expected income instrument, the estimate of the elasticity of tax-
able income becomes 0.575, (-value = 199) and all variables are significantly different
from zero at standard levels of significance. Furthermore, this value is in the range
obtained by Claus et al. (2012), using non-regression methods.
Using the expected tax rate instrument has a modest impact on the point estimate
of the elasticity of taxable income (0.676 compared with 0.575) but more than halves
the standard error, resulting in a -value of 5.4. Similarly all variables in the regression
now have higher coefficient -values. The use of the expected tax rate instrument
therefore appears to substantially improve the robustness of the estimated marginal
tax rate effect on taxable income, with a plausible mean value.
The specification in Table 7 only includes an intercept shift dummy, allowing for
observed income changes to differ for taxpayers with other income from those with only
wage and salary income. However, it cannot capture the potential for different tax rate
responsiveness by those with other income; for example, if other income is easier to
shift, re-classify or evade for tax purposes. To allow for the possibility that the elasticity
coefficient on ∆ log (1− ) depends on the composition of income, Table 8 adds an
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Table 7: Regression Estimates using Alternative Instruments
Dependent variable: log 02 − log 99
Parameter Standard
Independent variables estimate error −value
Standard instrument
Intercept 26.704 236.297 0.11
∆ log (1− ) -175.027 1630.677 -0.11
Age -0.240 2.561 -0.09
Age-squared 0.004 0.045 0.10
log 99 -2.591 22.383 -0.12
log 99 − log 98 1.897 18.733 0.10
Other income dummy -2.312 21.883 -0.11
Instrument based on expected income
Intercept 1.259 0.094 13.37
∆ log (1− ) 0.575 0.288 1.99
Age 0.036 0.003 13.04
Age-squared -0.0005 0.00003 -14.67
log 99 -0.181 0.0077 -23.61
log 99 − log 98 -0.121 0.0076 -15.86
Other income dummy 0.044 0.0078 5.71
Instrument based on expected tax rate
Intercept 1.244 0.087 14.29
∆ log (1− ) 0.676 0.125 5.39
Age 0.036 0.003 13.12
Age-squared -0.0005 0.00003 -14.99
log 99 -0.179 0.0068 -26.25
log 99 − log 98 -0.123 0.0071 -17.25
Dummy 0.046 0.007 6.52
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Table 8: Regression Estimates: Expected Tax Rate Instrument with Slope Dummy
Dependent variable: log 02 − log 99
Parameter Standard
Independent variables estimate error −value
Intercept 1.200 0.087 13.74
∆ log (1− ) 0.414 0.173 2.39
Age 0.036 0.003 13.54
Age-squared -0.0005 0.00003 -15.45
log 99 -0.176 0.0068 -25.75
log 99 − log 98 -0.121 0.0069 -17.65
Other-income dummy 0.054 0.0079 6.86
Other-income dummy×∆ log (1− ) 0.495 0.232 2.13
interaction term equal to the product of the dummy variable and ∆ log (1− ).17
The results suggest that the elasticity for those without other income is smaller,
at 0.414 (-ratio = 239) , while the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.495 and
significantly different from zero (-ratio = 213). That is, the estimated elasticity of
taxable income for those who have only wage and salary income, at 0.414, is around half
of the value for those who have income from other sources, at 0.909 (= 0414+ 0495).
This latter value is similar to values found by Claus et al. for the higher income
groups. It is consistent with the findings for the US by Saez (2004) that taxpayers’
non-salary income appears to be especially responsive, via income shifting, to marginal
tax rates and other tax parameters.18 However, Saez’s (2004) evidence for the 1986 US
tax reform was less clear regarding whether the observed growth of wage and salary
income after reform represented a tax response.
To test this aspect further, the total sample was decomposed into taxpayers with
and without at least one of the categories of non-wage-or-salary income sources (divi-
dends, trust income and so on). If it is either easier to alter other income than salary
income, or taxpayers have a greater propensity to do so, in response to tax changes,
then it might be expected that those taxpayers with non-salary income would demon-
17Here the term ∆ log (1− ) in the table denotes the difference, log (1− ˆ02)− log (1− 99) 
18Although there is a considerable overlap in the income distributions of those with a zero dummy
and those with a dummy equal to 1, income at the 90th percentile of the two distributions is $53,704
and $87,714 respectively. That is, the richest 10% (in terms of total taxable income) of taxpayers
with positive other income have substantially higher income compared to the richest 10% of taxpayers
with no other income.
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Table 9: Expected Tax Rate Instrument: Non-Wage Income
Dependent variable: log 02 − log 99
Independent variable: Parameter Standard Sample
∆ log (1− ) estimate error -value size20
Taxpayers:
All 0.676 0.125 5.39 38,743
With other income 0.514 0.141 3.65 28,435
Without other income 0.190 0.216 0.88 10,307
With other income in 1999 and 2002:
Dep. variable: all taxable income 0.220 0143 1.53 22,415
Dep. variable: other income only 2.484 0.341 7.28 22,415
strate a larger elasticity than taxpayers with no other income. Secondly, among the
subset of taxpayers with other income, the responsiveness of their other income to
a change in marginal tax rates might be expected to be greater than the equivalent
response for salary income.
This is likely to be important in the case of New Zealand’s 2001 reform. Though all
types of personal income (salary, dividends and so on) above the new $60,000 threshold
after the reform were taxed at 39 per cent, rather than 33 per cent, income received
by trusts and companies continued to be taxed at 33 per cent. Diversion of income to
trusts, and incorporation, are relatively easy (with a low cost) in New Zealand, and the
new 6 percentage point gap provided a strong incentive to shift income away from the
personal tax code to those alternatives. This can be expected to have further induced
reductions in other income received by individual taxpayers in the current sample in
response to the tax rise.19
Table 9 shows the regression parameters on ∆ log (1− ) for the specification in
Table 7 but for those taxpayer/income sub-samples. The estimate for all taxpayers
(0.676) is repeated from Table 7. Splitting the sample into taxpayers who had other
income in at least one of the three years (1998, 1999, 2002), and those with only salary
19There were additional complications associated with the reform that could induce income re-
sponses in either direction. For example, trust income received by trustees continued to be taxed at
33 per cent whereas it was taxed at 39 per cent if received by trust beneficiaries (with incomes over
$60). There were also greater post-reform incentives for intra-household shifting of salary and other
income, encouraging individual members facing lower marginal rates to declare a greater share of total
household income.
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income gives a much larger parameter estimate of 0.514 for those with other income
compared with the estimate of 0.19 for those with no other income. Only the former
is statistically significant at conventional levels with much more noise associated with
the 0.19 estimate.
Testing the sub-set of taxpayers with non-salary income both before and after re-
form (1999 and 2002), Table 9 confirms that the responsiveness of other income is sub-
stantially greater, with a parameter estimate on ∆ log (1− ) of 2.48 (-ratio = 728)
for other income, compared with 0.22 (-ratio = 153) for salary income.
The importance of the other income component of total taxable income, and its
response to the 2001 reform, can be seen in Figure 3. This shows the percentage
distribution of all other income across ($5000) income bands both in 1999 and 2002.
Figure 3: The Distribution of Other Income, 1999 & 2002
The first point to note is that ‘other income’ is not especially concentrated among
taxpayers with high taxable incomes; the bulk of other income is received by taxpayers
in the $30-70 taxable income range. This tends to suggest that the estimate above
of high responsiveness of other income to tax rate changes is not exclusively a high-
income earner phenomenon. Secondly, the clearest difference between the 1999 and
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20002 distributions of other income is the new large spike in 2002 around the new
$60 threshold introduced in the 2001 reform. That is, a much larger fraction of other
income in 2002 is accounted for by taxpayers with income around $60 than was the
case in 1999, with a compensating decrease in other income received by taxpayers with
taxable incomes around $25-35.
Unfortunately, the available data do not allow investigation of intra-household
transfers of income in response to the 2001 tax reform. However, the evidence in
Figure 3 may be indicative, in part, of previously low-income earners within a house-
hold (where the higher earner has income in excess of $60) taking a greater share of
declared household income after reform. That is, both household members’ incomes
move towards the $60 threshold in opposite directions. Section 6.3 below discusses in
more detail how different types of individuals responded to the tax reform.
6.3 Who Responded to the 2001 Reform?
The above results suggest that taxpayers in receipt of non-wage and salary income
responded especially strongly to the 2001 reform and, in particular, by altering the
declared ‘other income’ component of their taxable income. This subsection considers
whether these were exclusively, or mainly, those on higher incomes facing the 33 to 39
per cent tax rate change, or whether this response applied more generally.
Furthermore, the 2001 New Zealand tax reform involved a combination of constant,
increasing and decreasing tax rates, so it is possible to identify the categories of taxpayer
shown in Table 6 who contributed most to the observed responses. Table 6 shows that
it was mainly taxpayers in categories 3, 6, 7, 15 and 16 whose incomes responded in
the expected direction. These categories account for 75 per cent of all taxpayers in the
sample. From the combinations of ∆, ∆ , and ∆ ∗ which each category represents, it
is possible to identify those tax brackets within the New Zealand tax system in which
those taxpayers are located.
Figure 4 shows the tax schedules for 1999 and 2002, with tax rates rising for in-
comes above $60,000, remaining constant between $38,000 and $60,000 and falling for
taxpayers between $14,000 and $38,000. The Figure also shows the five categories of
taxpayer of interest. The unbroken arrows indicate the observed movement in those
taxpayers’ incomes and marginal tax rates between 1999 and 2002; the broken arrows
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indicate the predicted movement in their ‘expected tax rate’ in the absence of reform
based on the income dynamics described earlier.
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Figure 4: Tax Categories
For example, consider category 16, involving 152,000 taxpayers. Those taxpayers
experienced a fall in their income and actual tax rate, while their predicted tax rate
rose. This included two groups: taxpayers between $38 and $60 in 1999 whose
incomes fell to below the $38 threshold in 2002 but who were (in the absence of the
reform) expected to move above the $60 threshold. It also includes taxpayers with
incomes above $60 in 1999 whose 2002 income fell to less than $38. Their responses
are discussed further below.
Category 7 is another large sub-set of 194,000 taxpayers. The experienced income
increases took them towards the $34.2 (1999) or $38 (1999 and 2002) thresholds,
but their predicted tax rate increase implies that they were expected to experience an
income increase to above the $38 threshold. Thus the higher jump in marginal rates
at $38 after 2001 (from 21 to 33 per cent instead of from 24 to 33 per cent) may have
persuaded some taxpayers to declare lower income than otherwise expected, keeping
their 2002 declared income below $38.
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In addition to the categories listed above, category 1 in Table 6 captures a large
number of taxpayers (122,000) where ∆, ∆ , and ∆ ∗ are all positive. This includes
taxpayers for whom their ‘no reform’ predicted income increase exceeds their actual
income increase; that is, their response is consistent with a smaller declared income
increase in response to the tax rate change from 33 to 39 per cent. This includes
taxpayers below $60 in 1999 and 2002 who would otherwise have crossed that threshold
by 2002, and those above the $60 threshold in both years, as shown in Figure 4. The
standard instrument cannot account for the former group (below $60 in 1999 and
2002) because of the restriction that the instrumented tax rate is based on unchanged
income levels (∆ ∗ = 0 for incomes in the range $38 and $60).
In summary, actual and expected taxpayer income movements, as depicted in Fig-
ure 4, suggest a large amount of crossing, and bunching around, the $38 and $60
thresholds. This is confirmed by an examination of the distribution of taxable income
in 1999 and 2002. Figure 5 shows the two distributions of aggregate taxable income by
$1000 income band over the $16 to $100 range (the range relevant to the analysis
here). In addition to the general tendency for taxable incomes to rise over the three
years (the 2002 profile generally lies above the 1999 version), a large spike can be seen
to emerge around $60 in 2002 which did not exist in 1999. Further, the small spike
evident around $38 in 1999 is considerable larger by 2002.
Figure 5 also suggests an increased concentration of taxable income in the $38
to $60 range in 2002 compared with 1999. The percentage of taxpayers and taxable
income in this range rose from respectively 12 and 23 per cent to 15 and 26 per cent.
Almost all of this reflected a net movement out of the $9.5 to $38 bracket. While
the marginal tax rate in this bracket remained unchanged at 33 per cent before and
after reform, the increased concentration here is consistent with expected behavioural
responses to the combination of a reduced tax rate in the bracket below (24 to 21 per
cent) and the increased rate in the bracket above (33 to 39 per cent).
Finally, actual Inland Revenue data on numbers of taxpayers in various income
groups, and their share of income, in 2002 after the tax reform, can be compared
with those predicted by the income dynamics modelled. This is especially useful for
taxpayers with incomes above/below the $60 threshold where the new 39% tax rate
was introduced. Actual 2002 data for all taxpayers shows that 14.2 per cent of all
taxpayers with incomes over $16 (the equivalent group to that used above to model
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Figure 5: Distribution of Taxable Income
dynamics), had incomes in excess of $60. They accounted for 33.2 per cent of total
taxable income.21 Using expected income and the associated tax rate as instrument,
the equivalent percentages for predicted taxpayers and expected taxable income in
excess of $60 are 17.3 and 38.0 per cent. These values suggest plausible responses by
taxpayers to the higher marginal rate; that is, around 3 per cent of taxpayers, and 5
per cent of total taxable income shifted to below the $60 threshold after the reform,
relative to what would otherwise have been expected.
By itself, the increased bunching of taxable income around these two thresholds
in Figure 5, and income growth within the $38 to $60 bracket, might be considered
merely suggestive of responses to the 2001 reform. However, the regression evidence and
the income movements identified in Table 6 offer strong confirmation that this reflects
the predicted causal behavioural responses to tax reform when those predictions are
based on modelling income changes that occur both with and without that reform.
21Unlike the simualted dynamics data the published actual IRD data does not separate out those
with incomes above $1 million.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has examined estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using instru-
mental variable regression methods. It has argued that the ‘standard instrument’
for the net-of-tax rate − the rate that would be applicable post-reform but with un-
changed income levels − is unsatisfactory in contexts where there are large numbers of
taxpayers with exogenous changes in their taxable income. Two alternative tax rate
instruments were proposed, based estimates of the dynamics of taxable income for a
panel of taxpayers over a period that involved no tax changes.
The parameters derived from that procedure were then used to construct hypothet-
ical (or counterfactual) post-reform incomes that would be expected in the absence of
reform. The first method is based on the tax rate each individual would face if their
income were equal to ‘expected income’, conditional on income in two periods before
the tax change. The second alternative uses the form of the conditional distribution of
income for each taxpayer to obtain an instrument based on their ‘expected tax rate’.
These methods were applied to the 2001 tax reform in New Zealand. This involved
a convenient mix of marginal tax rate increases, decreases and no change across a wide
range of incomes. Comparing taxable incomes in 1999 and 2002, the paper first ex-
amined taxpayer responses in terms of observed correlations between income change
and changes in the actual and instrumented tax rates. Secondly, instrumental vari-
able regressions were examined. Thirdly, these results were compared with observed
and predicted changes in key parts of the taxable income distribution between 1999
and 2002. All three approaches suggest that observed income changes after reform
reflect the causal behavioural responses to tax reform predicted by the elasticity of
taxable income literature. However, an instrument based on the standard approach, of
assuming unchanged income levels after reform, performed poorly. Instruments that
are based on a model of income dynamics, estimated using extraneous information on
incomes over a three-year period without any tax structure changes, performed much
better, particularly the instrument based on an expected tax rate for each individual.
Importantly, they produced estimated behavioural responses that are both plausible
and consistent with earlier estimates obtained using different methods by Claus et al.
(2012).
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Appendix A: 1980s Tax Reforms in New Zealand
The first application of the instrumental variable approach to New Zealand was by
Thomas (2007), who examined the1980s income tax reforms using IRD data. The same
dataset is used here to consider the properties of the instrument. The tax structures
for 1986 and 1988 are shown in Table 10. The reforms involved a reduction in income
tax rates and a change in the direct—indirect tax mix as a result of the introduction of
a Goods and Services Tax (GST).
Table 10: NZ Income Tax Structure: 1986 and 1988
1986 Tax Structure 1988 Tax Structure
Income range Tax rate Income range Tax rate
1—6,000 0.20 1—9,500 0.15
6,001—25,000 0.23 9,501—30,000 0.30
25,001—30,000 0.451 30,001 0.48
30,001—38,000 0.561
38,000 0.66
The analysis is restricted to individuals aged 25 to 65. The number of those in
each of the possible outcomes, adjusted to population values using sample weights, is
shown in Table 11, where the number indicated in the left hand column refers to the
corresponding case in Table 3. The small number in category 18 is not surprising,
since this relates to people who reported no change in their taxable income. The large
number of individuals in category 18 have decreases in their taxable incomes despite
the fact that they have a reduction in both the tax rate they face and the rate they
would face without any change in income. A substantial component of the income
change must therefore arise from non-tax related factors.
Table 11: Numbers in Tax Change Categories: Thomas’s Data
Category Number (1000s)
3 226
9 512
18 163
Total 902
In carrying out regressions using (3), Thomas (2007) used the following exogenous
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variables: age; age-squared; 1986 taxable income; 1986 capital income; an entrepre-
neurship dummy. He also reported results separately for taxable income and labour
income, and for unweighted and weighted values.22 For present purposes, it is useful
to concentrate on taxable income, and only the age and 1986 income variables are
included.23 The income term is the most important exogenous variable: when only
the terms involving age are included, both the ordinary least squares and instrumental
variable estimates of the elasticity of taxable income were found to be negative (at
around −2 and −08 respectively). With all three exogenous variables, the instrumen-
tal variable estimate of  was 0.61, and with only taxable income in 1986 included it
was 0.58.24
22The elasticity in the latter case was found to be higher than for the former. Thomas argued that
this demonstrated a higher elasticity for higher-income groups.
23The inclusion of a term in age-squared implies an age-log-income profile that is cubic in form, so it
is not expected to have much influence on the results, given that most profiles are closer to quadratic.
24The -value when all three exogenous variables are included is 10.79. Excluding those in category
27 increases the instrumental variable estimate to 0.84, with a -value of 19.77.
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Appendix B: The Inland Revenue Data
The data used in this paper are personal income information sourced from the New
Zealand Inland Revenue Department’s (IRD’s) tax returns and employer PAYE records.
The database is a stratified random sample, including 2 per cent of all wage and salary
earners (which in turn includes people in receipt of taxable welfare benefits) and 10 per
cent of all other individual taxpayers, such as the self-employed. The database omits
individuals with no personal taxable income (unless they filed a tax return), and those
whose only income was from investments with the correct amount of tax deducted at
source and no requirement to file a tax return. The former group are not of interest for
this study, and the latter are expected to be a fairly small group representing a very
small proportion of total taxable income. The database does not include income not
attributed to natural persons, for example income held in companies or trusts.
Randomness is ensured by sampling taxpayers based on the last two digits of their
unique ‘IRD number’, which are issued broadly sequentially and not reflective of the
characteristics of the specific individual. In order to ensure these are representative
of the total individual taxpayer population, weights are applied to each observation in
the sample according to the characteristics of the individual. For 1999, the database
includes a total sample of 138,464 individual taxpayers, representing a total population
of 2,800,528 taxpayers. For 2002 the sample size increases to 139,420, representing a
taxpayer population of 2,962,200.
The database covers the years 1994 to 2009, and allows users to follow individuals
across time by use of their IRD number. Because filing requirements have changed
across time, the dataset contains a number of structural breaks. These include a break
across the 1999—2002 period considered here, when the pre-populated personal tax sum-
mary (PTS) replaced the old IR5 tax return. This had a minor impact on some income
tax data collected, particularly with regards to dividend and interest income below a
small threshold. Aside from salary and wage income data, the database also includes
data on business income, trust income, interest, dividends, rental income, shareholder-
employee salary, partnership income and other income. Expenses and losses claimed
(including those through LAQCs) are also recorded, as well as information on demo-
graphic characteristics such as date of birth and gender. These data are taken from a
range of sources, largely tax returns submitted to the IRD.
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For the regressions in this study, various restrictions are applied to the data. Firstly,
in recognition that various unrelated behavioural changes may bias the results, those
taxpayers who were younger than 25 in 1999, or older than 64 in 2002, are removed
from the sample. This fairly common restriction removes those taxpayers likely to be
in the very early stages of a career, as well as those likely to have retired at the age
of 65 (the age of eligibility for New Zealand superannuation). Secondly, those with
1999 taxable income less than $16,000 or greater than $1,000,000 are excluded from
the sample. The first of these restrictions is particularly important in order to remove
a significant segment of the population who received some form of government benefit,
as abatement rates mean that these individuals face different effective marginal tax
rates to standard taxpayers. Finally, the sample is necessarily reduced to only those
individuals who have sufficient data in all six relevant income years (ending 1998,
1999, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005). Some taxpayers either entered or exited the tax
system over this time, which means that their income dynamics cannot be estimated.
A number of smaller, less significant restrictions are also imposed, such as the removal
of zero or negative taxable income values and data entry errors (such as negative ages).
Combined, these restrictions reduce the sample size to 38,744, which, when weighted
up to reflect the population, represents 803,920 individual taxpayers (29 per cent of
the original 1999 weighted sample).
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